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Abstract—Inference based techniques are one of the major ap-
proaches to analyze DNS data and detecting malicious domains.
The key idea of inference techniques is to first define associations
between domains based on features extracted from DNS data.
Then, an inference algorithm is deployed to infer potential
malicious domains based on their direct/indirect associations with
known malicious ones. The way associations are defined is key
to the effectiveness of an inference technique. It is desirable to
be both accurate (i.e., avoid falsely associating domains with no
meaningful connections) and with good coverage (i.e., identify
all associations between domains with meaningful connections).
Due to the limited scope of information provided by DNS data, it
becomes a challenge to design an association scheme that achieves
both high accuracy and good coverage.
In this paper, we propose a new association scheme to identify
domains controlled by the same entity. Our key idea is an in-
depth analysis of active DNS data to accurately separate public
IPs from dedicated ones, which enables us to build high-quality
associations between domains. Our scheme avoids the pitfall
of naive approaches that rely on weak “co-IP” relationship of
domains (i.e., two domains are resolved to the same IP) that
results in low detection accuracy, and, meanwhile, identifies many
meaningful connections between domains that are discarded by
existing state-of-the-art approaches. Our experimental results
show that the proposed association scheme not only significantly
improves the domain coverage compared to existing approaches
but also achieves better detection accuracy.
Existing path-based inference algorithm is specifically designed
for DNS data analysis. It is effective but computationally ex-
pensive. To further demonstrate the strength of our domain
association scheme as well as improving inference efficiency,
we investigate the effectiveness of combining our association
scheme with the generic belief propagation algorithm. Through
comprehensive experiments, we show that this approach offers
significant efficiency and scalability improvement with only minor
negative impact of detection accuracy, which suggests that such
a combination could offer a good tradeoff for malicious domain
detection in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
DNS data is one of the most notable sources of information
utilized to detect malicious domains [55], [33]. In general,
there are two types of approaches that complement each
other. In classification-based approaches, a classifier is built
from local features of domains extracted from DNS data,
which may be further enriched with other network and host
features. A classifier is then trained using a ground truth
dataset of benign and malicious domains, and used to classify
new unknown domains. Inference-based approaches, which is
the focus of this paper, are centered on building associations
between domains from DNS data to reflect their meaningful
connections (e.g., deployed and controlled by the same entity).
Once such associations are defined, an inference algorithm is
deployed to reason the maliciousness of a domain based on
its direct/indirect associations with known malicious ones.
Inference-based approaches are based on a simple intuition:
if a domain has strong associations with known malicious
domains, it is likely to be malicious as well. Clearly how
such associations are defined is key to the effectiveness of
malicious domain detection. Ideally, it should satisfy two
properties. First, it should be accurate, in the sense that
the connections identified are indeed strongly relevant to
maliciousness inferences. For example, it is reasonable to
define associations when two domains are controlled and
deployed by the same entity: if one domain is malicious,
it is probably either directly deployed by or compromised
by an attacker. In either case, it raises the probability of
maliciousness of the other domain. As a contrast, it would
not be reasonable to associate two domains just because they
start with the same character. Associations based on irrelevant
or weak connections would result in high false positives in
malicious domain detection. Second, associations should be
defined to have good coverage: it should reveal as many
relevant connections between domains as possible. An overly
strict association (e.g., two domains must have the same owner
in their WHOIS records and the same authoritative server,
be with the same subdomain names, and meanwhile have the
same access pattern at all time) would overlook a large portion
of relevant connections between domains, and thus could only
detect a small number of malicious domains. Ideally, we
would like domain associations to be both highly accurate
and with high coverage. However, in practice it becomes quite
challenging to do so because, depending on how they are
collected, the scope of information in DNS data could be very
limited.
In this paper, we investigate the design of effective domain
association schemes based on active DNS data to enhance
inference-based malicious domain detection. Active DNS data
is collected by periodically querying a large pre-compiled
list of domains in the Internet. One advantage of active
DNS data is that it does not contain Internet activities of
any real users, and could be made widely available with no
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privacy concerns. However, compared to other types of DNS
data (e.g., passive DNS data or logs of DNS servers), the
information provided by active DNS data is quite limited: only
the (possibly incomplete) mapping between domains and IPs at
different periods of time is available. This imposes significant
challenges to reveal meaningful connections between domains.
Belief propagation (BP), as a popular inference algorithm,
has been successfully applied to analyze system and network
logs and infer malicious entities. It is compelling to apply
BP directly to detect malicious domains by treating the active
DNS data as a bipartite graph, where on one side are domains
and the other are IPs, and an edge represents the resolution of
a domain to an IP. This approach implicitly builds associations
between domains if they are resolved to the same IP (a “co-
IP” relationship). Intuitively, it seems that domains hosted
at the same IPs tend to be related and could be used for
maliciousness inferences. However, as pointed out by Khalil
et al. [29], this is a very weak association as it fails to consider
the many complicated ways that domains are deployed in
the Internet. In particular, public web hosting services could
cause unrelated domains to be hosted at the same pool of IPs.
Malicious domain inference based on co-IP relationships thus
would result in a very poor detection accuracy.
To overcome the inherent weakness of simple “co-IP” asso-
ciations, Khalil et al. proposes to establish explicit association
between two domains if they share common IPs that do not all
come from the same Autonomous Systems (AS). The number
of ASs of these common IPs further indicates the strength of
the association. The intuition is reasonable: even with web
hosting services, it is unlikely that two unrelated domains
happen to be hosted at the same set of IPs belonging to
different ASs during a short period of time (say a week). The
more the number of different ASs among the shared IPs is,
the more likely their deployments are coordinated, and thus
the more likely these domains are related.
However, the above associations, though most of the time
accurate, tend to be overly restrictive, which would result in
poor coverage of malicious domains. Specifically, it largely fo-
cuses on domains that frequently change hosting environments
among different ASs. Related domains that do not change
hosting IPs and those that change hosting IPs within the same
AS would be omitted. In fact, we notice that the majority of
domains with shared IPs in active DNS data belong to this
uncovered category (e.g., 82% of domain pairs with common
IPs in the data of the week of Feb. 4-10 2017 belong to this
category). Meanwhile, the accuracy of associations could still
be affected by web hosting services whose hosting IPs span
over multiple ASs (e.g., both AS16509 and AS14618 belong
to Amazon). Associations could still be incorrectly established
between unrelated domains if they happen to use the same web
hosting service.
Our goal in this research is to define a new set of richer
and stronger associations that both expand the coverage of
domains as well as improve the detection accuracy. To expand
the coverage of domains, we first explore the possibility of
differentiating between dedicated hosting environments and
the public hosting ones. Our intuition is that domains that
share dedicated IPs are likely owned by the same entity, and
hence are related, irrespective of the number of ASs. For
this purpose, we identify a set of features of IPs in active
DNS data, and build a classifier to distinguish these two types
of different IPs. We then propose a new association scheme
based on the classification of IPs. Specifically, two domains
are associated if they either (i) share at least one dedicated
IP, or (ii) share more than one public IP from different ASs.
Our experiments show that, used within an existing path-based
inference algorithm [29], the new associations significantly
expand the coverage of related domains. More importantly, the
proposed new association proves to be also stronger and more
meaningful as evidenced by the improvement in detection
accuracy.
The path-based inference algorithm is specifically designed
for DNS data analysis. It is effective but computationally
expensive. To further demonstrate the strength of our domain
association scheme as well as improving inference efficiency,
we further investigate the effectiveness of combining our asso-
ciation scheme with the generic belief propagation algorithm.
Through comprehensive experiments, we show that this ap-
proach significantly improves the efficiency and scalability of
malicious domain inference with only minor negative impacts
on detection accuracy, which suggests that such a combination
would offer a good tradeoff for malicious domain detection in
practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we provide background material about DNS data, and the state
of the art inference algorithms, namely, Belief Propagation
and Path-based algorithm. Section III-B defines and constructs
domain associations. Specifically, in this section, we first
provide details about our novel IP classification scheme and
then use it to construct domain graphs. Section IV presents
the experiments to show the domain coverage and detection
accuracy. We discuss detection accuracy and scalability in
Section V. Section VI critically analyzes the work closely
related to ours and justifies why our approach is superior.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of Domain Name System
(DNS) data and the two state-of-the-art malicious domain
inference algorithms, namely belief propagation and path-
based.
A. DNS Data
DNS is a hierarchical naming system that helps locate any
resource connected to the Internet. In fact, it is one of the
core protocol suites of the Internet. It provides a distributed
database that maps domain name to record sets, such as IP
addresses. DNS consists of recursive resolvers, authoritative
name servers, and root name servers. Every DNS query starts
from a recursive resolver, which usually resides within the
local network where the query is issued. The recursive resolver
returns the IP address of the queried domain from its cache, if
2
present, if not it queries a root server. The root server responds
with a referral to a Top Level Domain (TLD) server such
as com or org DNS server. Subsequently, through the TLD
server, the recursive resolver is provided with a referral to
an authoritative server, which stores the domain name to IP
mapping. Finally, the DNS query is completed with a resolved
IP address for the queried domain name.
DNS data can be obtained by deploying sensors in the
DNS query process. Based on the location and the method
of collection, the DNS data can be grouped into three main
categories: passive DNS data, active DNS data, and logs of
DNS servers. The logs of DNS servers provide the richest
source of information as they directly capture activities of
each individual user. Passive DNS [55] captures traffic by
cooperative deployment of sensors in various locations of the
DNS hierarchy. For example, Farsight passive DNS data [23]
utilizes sensors deployed behind DNS resolvers and provides
aggregate information about domain resolutions. Active DNS
data is collected by periodically querying a large pre-compiled
list of domains in the Internet (e.g., [33]). It is true that passive
DNS data has been an invaluable source of information for de-
tecting and mitigating malicious activities in the Internet [18],
[27], [29]. However, in this paper, we focus on active DNS
data due to the difficulty of obtaining other types of DNS data
including passive DNS data and logs of DNS servers because
of sensitivity of information or financial costs [23], [33].
One advantage of active DNS data is that it does not
contain Internet activities of any real users, and could be
made widely available with no privacy concerns. However,
compared to other types of DNS data, active DNS data offer
limited information: only the (possibly incomplete) mapping
between domains and IPs at different periods of time. Further,
if DNS queries are issued from a limited set of hosts, the
collected DNS data could be localized to the locations of
those hosts and may fail to identify all IPs associated with a
given domain (e.g., websites on content distribution networks).
This imposes significant challenges to identify meaningful
connections between domains. Another limitation is that the
techniques that rely on user level features of DNS data, such
as user query patterns, to detect malicious domains fail to
work with active DNS data as DNS queries are not made by
individual users but rather by the data collector. Despite these
limitations, we show in this paper that active DNS data can be
utilized to construct strong associations among domains and
subsequently detect malicious domains with high accuracy.
B. Belief Propagation (BP)
BP [57] is an efficient approximation algorithm for solving
inference problems on graphical models such as Bayesian net-
works [24] and Markov random fields [43]. The algorithm was
first proposed by Judea Pearl [39] in 1982. BP was initially
formulated on trees, but since then it has shown to work on
poly-trees and then subsequently on general graphs [58].
First, we provide the inituition and high-details of BP. In
BP, each node infers a final belief distribution by listening
to its neighbors. BP is an iterative message passing process.
In each iteration, each node updates and passes messages to
its neighbors based on the messages it received from other
neighbours in the previous iteration. This process continues
until all the messages converge. The final belief of each node
is calculated based on the final messages. The high-level idea
is that given a small set of labeled nodes, BP infers the labels
of the rest of the nodes in the graph. The propagation of belief
also depends on either the homophily (”birds of a feather flock
together”) or the heterophily (”opposites attract”) property of a
given network. The network graphs we are dealing with in this
work are known to demonstrate certain homophily properties.
That is, if a node is surrounded by many malicious nodes than
benign nodes, that node is likely to be malicious as well.
BP has already been applied in the field of malicious domain
detection [28], [37]. For example, Manadhata et. al [37] apply
BP over host-domain bipartite graphs, which represent hosts
querying domains, in order to discover new malicious domains
based on known malicious and benign domains as ground
truth. They collected passive DNS data from HTTP proxies
deployed in a global enterprise. The intuition behind their
associations is that if a host access a malicious domain, it
is likely to be infected or compromised. Further, the domains
queried by this infected host are likely to be malicious as
well. In fact, Manadhata et. al empirically show that the
belief propagation algorithm achieves high detection rates of
malicious domains with low false positive rates. In this work,
we adopt the BP implementation in [37].
Now we are going to take a closer look at the BP algorithm
for the benefit of the readers who are not familiar with BP.
Specifically in BP, each node tells each neighboring node what
its belief on each possible states (i.e. the marginal probability
of being in each state) based on its initial belief of itself and
the belief of the rest of its neighboring nodes. For example,
if most of the neighbors of a node are malicious, that node
informs other neighbours that it believe that they are more
malicious than benign. BP iteratively propagates the beliefs of
a small set of nodes with known beliefs throughout the graph
until convergence.
Formally, given an undirected graph G = (V,E), where
V and E are the set of nodes and edges, respectively. Each
node vi ∈ V is modeled as a discrete random variable Xi,
where i ∈ {1, n} and n = |V |. Each random variable
can be in one of the finite states in S, that is sj ∈ S,
where j ∈ {1,m} with m finite states. For example, in our
problem setting, each node represents a domain or an IP and
each discrete random variable can be in either malicious or
benign state. This graphical model defines a joint probability
distribution P (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) over the nodes in G. By
”belief”, we simply mean the marginal probability being in
each possible state. The exact inference algorithm computes
the marginal probability distribution P (Xi) of each discrete
random variable Xi given a set of observed/labeled nodes,
ground truth in our case. As shown in Formula 1, the marginal
probability of a given node, say Xj , can be computed by taking
the sum over all possible states of all the other nodes in the
graph. The complexity of this equation is exponential in the
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number of nodes. As a scalable solution, we adopt the BP
approximation provided in [37], which computes approximate
marginal probabilities with quadratic complexity in the number
of nodes, that is O(V 2) in the worst case.
p(Xj) =
∑
Xi,i∈{1,n}\j
p(X1, X2, X3, . . . , Xn) (1)
As mentioned earlier, the labeled nodes represent the ground
truth. They simply provide us the prior probability of being
in each possible state. Usually, φi(sj) is used to denote the
prior probability of node i being in state sj . BP algorithm
infers the beliefs, bi(sj) for each node i by computing the
marginal probability for each possible state sj , j ∈ {1,m}.
The statistical properties between any two connected nodes
i and j is captured by the edge potential function denoted
by ψij(si, sj), where nodes i and j are in states si and sj
respectively. As in our application, if each node can be in
one of the two states, benign or malicious, ψij(si, sj) can be
represented by a 2×2 matrix, where each represents a possible
state of the two edge nodes.
In each iteration, each node i passes a message vector, mij ,
of size |S| to each neighbor j and mij(sr) denotes the message
from i to j for state sr. It is computed as shown in Formula 2.
mtij(sr) =
∑
sp∈S
φi(sp)ψij(sp, sr) ∏
k∈Ni/j
mt−1ki (sp)
 (2)
where t is the current iteration count, mt is the message in
iteration t, mt−1 is the message in the previous iteration, and
N is the set of neighboring nodes of i. The message mtij(sr)
captures node i’s belief of node j being in state sr based on
the information node i received from its neighbors during the
previous iteration.
The algorithm stops when the difference between messages
from two consecutive round for all edges is below a predefined
threshold value. BP is proved to be always converging for
trees, but it may or may not converge for graphs with loops.
Having said that, in practice BP has been shown to produce
reasonably accurate results for even graphs with loops. Usu-
ally, BP algorithm is run until one of the following conditions
are met: (1) BP converges to the specified threshold value
or (2) A predetermined number of message iterations are
completed.
Once BP stops, Formula 3 shows how the final belief is
computed for each node.
bi(sr) = Cφi(sr)
∏
k∈Ni
mki(sr) (3)
where C is normalizing constant such that
∑
sp∈S bi(sp) =
1.
C. Path based Algorithm
Khalil et al. [29] designed a path-based malicious domain
detection algorithm over a domain graph, which is built from
a domain resolution graph (which domains are being hosted
at which IPs). A domain graph comprises nodes representing
domains and weighted edges that represent strengths of direct
associations between domains. The algorithm further computes
indirect associations between pairs of domains. Specifically,
the strength of a path between two nodes u and v is defined
as the multiplication of the weights of the edges on the path.
The association between u and v is defined as the weight of the
strongest path between them. Given a set of known malicious
domains, the maliciousness of a domain is then inferred as an
exponentially decaying weighted sum of its associations with
all known malicious ones.
More specifically, let S be the set of known malicious
domains, also called seed. Given a domain u, denote M(u)
as the list (assoc(s1, u), . . . , assoc(sn, u)), where si ∈ S and
assoc(si, u) >= assoc(si+1, u), for i = 1, . . . , n−1. In other
words, M(u) is a sorted list of the associations of u to each
of those in the seed. The malicious score of u given S is then
defined as:
mal(u, S) = assoc(s1, u)+(
1− assoc(s1, u)
) ∑
i=2,...,n
1
2i−1
assoc(si, u))
(4)
Intuitively, the largest association between u and a known
malicious domain contributes the most to the maliciousness
of u. This is further enhanced with its association with
other domains in the seed in an exponential decay manner.
This design is to capture two intuitions of malicious domain
inferences. First, a strong association with even a single known
malicious domain would be convincing evidence of a potential
malicious domain. Second, weak association with multiple
known malicious domains cannot be easily accumulated to
form strong evidence of a domain’s maliciousness, because
weak associations may happen in many legitimate network
management scenarios.
In this paper we explore using both BP and the path-
based algorithm for malicious domain inferences based on
our association scheme and show how our proposed domain
association scheme could help improve detection accuracy and
domain coverage.
III. DEFINING AND CONSTRUCTING DOMAIN
ASSOCIATIONS
In this section, we first provide the details of IP classification
as a prerequisite for defining associations. Then, we define
our associations and the domain graphs generated from them.
Finally, we conduct experiments to evaluate the detection
accuracy and the domain coverage of our associations.
A. IP Classification
As mentioned in Section I, we classify the IPs in domain-
IP graphs into public and dedicated as a basis for defining a
new set of stronger and more meaningful domain associations.
We define public domain-hosting IPs, public IPs for short, as
those IPs that are publicly available for domain hosting and
4
consequently, host domains from multiple unrelated entities
(e.g. Amazon Public IPs [8], Ephemeral external IPs in Google
Cloud Platform [10]). In contrast, dedicated domain-hosting
IPs, dedicated IPs for short, are defined as those IPs that
are exclusively used to host domains of the same entity for
a certain time interval (e.g. Amazon Elastic IPs [9], IPs of
most universities and government institutions).
Naturally, the first option to identify public IPs is to check
in publicly available APIs from hosting providers [4] or static
cloud IP lists compiled by hosting providers [2] and third par-
ties [6]. However, such APIs may have rate limits of checking
or such static lists may often compiled manually and cannot
keep up with domain hosting dynamics. Additionally, such
tools usually have limited coverage of IPs. Most importantly,
they may not capture the notions of public and dedicated IPs
as we define in this study. For example, Which-Cloud [11]
not only have limited coverage of cloud hosting IPs, but also
do not differentiate between public and dedicated IPs. More
specifically, Which-Cloud classifies Amazon Elastic IPs [9]
as public. However, these IPs are usually allocated to one
entity for a certain time interval, and hence, are considered
dedicated according to our definition. For example, consider
the IP ”35.160.237.41” from the domain graph of the week
of Feb. 4-10 2017. Which-Cloud classifies this IP as public
since it belongs to Amazon AWS IP pool. However, we
classify this IP as dedicated, even though it belongs to a public
hosting organization. By consulting DNS databases as well as
VirusTotal [53], we verify that this IP is used to host five
domains during our study period: spoonerrisk.com, spooner-
inc.net, spoonermai.com, medadmin.com and thomasproduc-
tiontrainingmanuals.com, all of which belong to the same
entity, Spooner Inc. and its subsidiaries.
In the following, we walk through the details of our solution
to classify IPs into dedicated and public according to our
definition of the two classes.
Attribute Selection. The accuracy of classification depends
on the selection of the right attributes of DNS resolved IPs.
After studying many IP attributes, we selected 7 attributes that
collectively differentiate dedicated IPs from public ones. As
shown in Table I, we categorize them into two groups: (i)
domain based attributes and (ii) IP block based attributes. The
three attributes in the first group are: the number of fully qual-
ified domain names (FQDNs) (e.g., www.foo.example.com is
a FQDN), the number of second level domains (2LDs) (e.g.,
example.com), and the number of third level domains (3LDs)
(e.g., foo.example.com), which an IP hosts during a certain
time period (e.g., one week). Attributes 4-6 (Table I) of the
second group are similar to attributes 1-3, but computed over
all the IPs, in the selected data set, which belong to the same
/24-subnet of the IP under consideration. Attribute 7 is the
number of IPs in the /24-subnet of the IP under consideration,
that has been used to host domains in the selected data set.
Domain based attributes capture statistics about the domains
that each IP is associated with. Intuitively, a public IP has
many second level domains, whereas a dedicated IP has less.
Web-hosting services and cloud providers host many domains
TABLE I: Selected IP Attributes for IP Classification
Attributes Set # Attributes Name for IP
Domain based attributes
1 # of FQDNs
2 # of second level domains
3 # of third level domains
IP block based attributes
4 # of FQDNs in its /24 IP block
5 # of second level domains in its /24 IP block
6 # of third level domains in its /24 IP block
7 # of IPs in its /24 IP block
under the same IP block. That is, such public hosting providers
usually allocate complete blocks or large portion of the same
IP block for public hosting, which results in a large number
of domain resolutions within such blocks. On the other hand,
dedicated hosting usually uses a fewer number of domains
within their IP blocks. The attributes of the second group
help to correctly classify dedicated IPs that happen to host
a relatively large number of domains (e.g., a big company and
its subsidiaries), which otherwise may be misclassified based
on the first group of features.
Ground Truth Collection. To train any classifier, one needs
to first compile a ground truth of labeled data. We use the
following process to collect a ground truth consisting of both
dedicated IPs and public IPs. We manually verify these IPs,
by checking whether the domains hosted at each of these IPs
belong to the same entity using WHOIS database [12].
• Dedicated IP ground truth collection: Intuitively, it is
less likely for a university or a government website to
share IPs with domains from other different organiza-
tions. We compiled a set of organizations that are likely
to use dedicated IP hosting for their domains including
known universities from different countries (e.g., MIT,
Purdue, Tsinghua University, Oxford university), gov-
ernmental organizations (e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services, Sandia National Laboratories), military
related organizations (e.g., US Coast Guard Home, U.S.
Air Force, United States Army), and private organizations
(e.g., Google, Oracle, AliBaba, NJEDge.Net, Inc., Merit
Network Inc.). Such communities of organizations usu-
ally use certain top level domains such as, .gov, .edu, .ml,
and .com. We then compile the set of IPs that are used to
host domains from these communities. We check all the
ASs of the IPs in a one-week active DNS data and search
for keywords such as “University” and “Government” to
identify research institutes and government agencies. For
other types of organizations, we simply randomly select
IPs from the active DNS data. Then, we manually check
if these IPs are historically only used to host domains
belonging to specific organizations. For example, for
purdue.edu, the AS of its IPs is indeed “PURDUE -
Purdue University, US”, and the IP “128.210.7.200” has
been used to host only the domain purdue.edu at least
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Fig. 1: Attribute Importance of IP classification
since 2014. We conduct further manual verification when
the AS of an IP is not directly linked to the domain. For
example, the AS of the IP of tsinghua.edu.cn is ”China
Education and Research Network Center”, which does
not seem directly related to Tsinghua University. How-
ever, further investigation shows that Chinese universities
indeed get their dedicated IPs from this AS to host their
domains.
• Public IP ground truth collection: Similar to the
dedicated IP ground truth, we first select a set of sec-
ond level domains of popular web-hosting and cloud
provider domains, such as Amazon AWS, bulehost.com
and ehost.com. Then, we identify FQDNs belonging to
these 2LDs from our active DNS dataset and the resolving
IPs are marked as candidate public IPs. However, some
of the IPs in this list may be assigned for dedicated
use. That is, some cloud IPs may be reserved and
exclusively used by a single entity for a certain period
of time (e.g. Amazon Elastic IPs [9]), and hence may
not qualify as public IPs as defined above. Therefore, we
manually check domains hosted at each candidate public
IPs and verify whether they are owned by the same entity
based on their WHOIS records, the length of continuous
duration of domain IP mapping (e.g., using the DNS TTL
of domain-IP resolution), and possibly the contents of
these websites.
Classification Algorithm. We have tried different classifiers
including decision trees, SVM, and random forest and found
that semi-supervised random forest is the most suitable clas-
sifier for our IP classification problem [34]. Semi-supervised
random forest is a machine learning technique where it uses
labeled data (seed) as well as unlabeled data to do the
classification. We design a random forest classifier based on
the aforementioned 7 attributes extracted from the active DNS
dataset. The classifier is implemented using the Python scikit-
learn package [7]. Notice that random forest is an iterative
algorithm. In each round, it uses the seed to classify a set
of IPs from the unlabeled data set and adds it to the input
seed. The new seed and the remaining unlabeled domains
are then used in the second round, and so on until all the
unlabeled set is labeled. The classification procedure is shown
in Algorithm 1. After each classification round, we revise the
seeds based on the two thresholds, confidence threshpublic
and confidence threshdedicated. We set the thresholds
confidence threshpublic and confidence threshdedicated
to 0.5 and 0.9 respectively in order to obtain a classifica-
tion accuracy above 98%. The subsequent iterations uses the
manually collected seed as well as the already labeled IPs as
the new seed. The algorithm converges when the two output
sets, IPpublic and IPdedicated, remain unchanged. We observe
that random forest classifier converges in 10 to 11 rounds
for the active DNS dataset we use in this study. Figure 1
shows the importance of each attribute after convergence. Out
of the 7 attributes, IP block based attributes clearly have
more significance in the classification compared to domain
based attributes. While some dedicated IPs (e.g., IPs of big
organizations) may exhibit similar domain based attributes to
public IPs, dedicated IP blocks are highly unlikely to exhibit
similar attributes to public IP blocks, which makes IP block
based attributes more distinctive. In other words, it is more
likely for IPs in public blocks to have consistent domain
attributes compared to IPs in dedicated blocks, which results
in different block based domain attributes.
The /24-subnet for the IP classification is chosen based on
the accuracy of the classifier. We evaluated the accuracy of the
classifier for different subnet sizes from 12 to 30. It is observed
that when the subnet sizes are either large, i.e. close to 12 or
small, i.e. close to 30, the accuracy of the classifier falls below
98%. Based on the accuracy, we identified several candidate
subset sizes including 18, 20, 22, 24 and 26. As explained
later, we selected /24-subnet out of the above candidate subnets
as it results in the lowest false positive rate when detecting
malicious domains. Intuitively, large blocks are most likely
shared by multiple entities, which leads to wrong associations
between domains that are not owned by the same entity and
hence results in high false positives. On the other hand, small
blocks may split domains owned by the same entity, which
may result in missing important associations among domains
owned by the same entity.
B. Construction of Domain Graphs
IP classification is motivated by the need to define a new set
of domain associations that strike the right balance between
domain coverage and detection accuracy. As mentioned earlier,
a weak or irrelevant association would result in high false
positives; meanwhile, an overly restrictive/strong association
will overlook many potentially malicious domains as they do
not possess such a strong association with known malicious
ones. In other words, many such domains would be filtered
out before an inference algorithm could be applied. Our key
observation is that dedicated IPs host domains that belong to
the same entity, and hence are related. On the other hand,
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Input : IPp labeled, public IPs in the seed
IPd labeled, dedicated IPs in the seed
IPunlabeled, DNS resolved IPs to be classified
Output: IPpublic, IPs classified as public including seed
IPdedicated, IPs classified as dedicated
including seed
IPpublic, IPdedicated = IPp labeled, IPd labeled
while True do
model = train classifier module(IPpublic,
IPdedicated)
S = predict unknown ip(model, IPunlabeled)
for each element in S do
# IP address
IP = element.ip ;
scorepublic = element.public confidence score
;
# dedicated confidence score
scorededicated = 1− scorepublic ;
if scorepublic > confidence threshpublic then
Move IP from IPunlabeled to IPpublic;
else if
scorededicated > confidence threshdedicated
then
Move IP from IPunlabeled to IPdedicated;
end
# convergence
if |IPpublic| is not changed and |IPdedicated| is not
changed then
exit while;
end
end
for each IP in IPunlabeled do
Move IP to IPpublic ;
end
return IPpublic, IPdedicated
Algorithm 1: IP Classification Algorithm
public IPs host domains from many unrelated entities, and
therefore, sharing a public IP is not a conclusive evidence
of a good relationship among domains. In the latter case, we
utilize the traces left by the evading behavior of malicious
domains to create associations among them. More specifically,
some owners of malicious domains frequently change their
hosting environment to evade detection, which creates intrinsic
relations among them. We use here the same heuristic that is
used in [29] to capture such behavior, that is, the number of
common ASs in which domains are hosted during a certain
time period.
We define two types of new domain associations based on
the outcome of the IP classifier:
• The first association type utilizes the common dedicated
IPs as well as the common ASs between domains.
More specifically, two domains are associated if they:
share either (i) at least one dedicated IP, which we call
the dedicated association rule; or (ii) more than one
public IP from more than one AS, which we call the
public association rule. The dedicated association rule is
motivated by the fact that sharing even a single dedicated
IP is a good evidence of a relation since, by definition,
dedicated IPs host domains that belong to the same
entity. The public association rule is triggered by the
observation that some malicious domain owners avoid
using dedicated IPs as they may be easily identified and
blocked. At the same time, they frequently move across
different hosting environments to avoid detection and
blocking of the domains themselves.
The strength of the first type of associations depends on
the number of shared dedicated and public IPs. Specif-
ically, given a pair of domains d1 and d2 that share a
set I of resolved IPs, let IPd denote the set of resolved
dedicated IPs in I , IPu is the set of resolved public IPs in
I , while AS(IPu) denote the set of ASs that the resolved
public IPs in I belong to. We define the association
weight between two domains d1 and d2, w(d1, d2), as
w(d1, d2) =
{
1− 1n+1 ; if d1 6= d2
1 ; if d1 = d2
where n = 2|IPd|+ |AS(IPu)| − 1
(5)
Note that the weight is in [0, 1] and the weight of the
association between the domain and itself is 1. Formula 5
captures four intuitions: (1) A minimum of one dedicated
IP or two common ASs are required to establish an asso-
ciation, (2) sharing a dedicated IP is stronger than sharing
AS, (3) the more the number of ASs and dedicated IPs
are, the stronger the association, and (4) the size of ASs
and dedicated IPs set has a diminishing return of strength.
• The second type of associations is similar to the first
type with only one difference. It relaxes the dedicated
association rule by using the shared /24-subnets instead
of the shared dedicated IPs. More specifically, we replace
the dedicated association rule with a new rule, dubbed
relaxed association rule. In the relaxed association rule,
two domains are associated if they are resolved to dedi-
cated IPs that belong to the same /24-subnet. The strength
of this type of associations follows the same intuition as
that in the first type of associations with some changes
in Formula 5. More specifically, we replace 2|IPd| in
Formula 5 with |IPd1| + |IPd2|, where IPd1 and IPd2
are the set of dedicated IPs in the shared /24-subnets to
which domains d1 and d2 are resolved, respectively. For
example, assume that d1 is resolved to ip1 and ip2 in
subnet1, ip3 in subnet2, and ip4 in subnet3; while d2 is
resolved into ip2 in subnet1, ip5 in subnet2. The number
of shared subnets between d1 and d2 is 2 (subnet1 and
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subnet2), |IPd1| = 2 + 1 = 3, and |IPd2| = 1 + 1 = 2.
We build two domain graphs based on the aforementioned
two types of associations. The first graph captures the first
type of associations and is dubbed, G-New to differentiate it
from the domain graph in [29], which we call G-Baseline. The
second graph captures the second type of association and is
dubbed, G-Relaxed. Figure 2 shows an example of an original
domain-IP graph and the three constructed domain graphs, G-
Baseline, G-New, and G-Relaxed.
IV. DOMAIN COVERAGE VERSUS DETECTION ACCURACY
In this section we study the impact of the different types of
associations on domain coverage and detection accuracy. We
first explain the dataset and the ground truth used, then we
present the results.
Active DNS Dataset. Our experiments are performed on
the active DNS datasets made available by the system called
Thales by the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Active DNS
project [33], [1]. Thales scans DNS using a set of seed domain
list compiled from multiple sources, including public blacklists
(e.g. [21], [59], [50]), the Alexa list [13], the Common Crawl
dataset [3], the domain feed from an undisclosed security
vendor, and the zone files for the TLDs consisting of com,
net, biz and org. We observe that Thales provides a complete
coverage of domains in its seed list roughly in 3 days. Cyber
criminals in general make extensive use of short lived random
disposable domains to carry out malicious activities. Domains
with long term malicious activities are likely to be identified
and blocked. In general, long-lived domains are likely to be
benign. Even though sometimes such benign domains may get
compromised, their administrators eventually clean and regain
control of them. Therefore, we focus our analysis on new
domain-IP mappings that are first observed in a certain time
period. Similar to [29], we set the study period to one week,
which is long enough for Thales to crawl all the domains
in its seed, and meanwhile not too long, thus minimizing
long-lived domains included. We conduct experiments over
two time periods: (i) Feb. 4-10, 2017 (week-1), and (ii)
Feb. 20-26, 2017 (week-2). Each dataset comprises a list of
< domain, IP > tuples of domains and the hosting IPs. Each
dataset is represented by a bipartite graph with domains on
one side and IPs on the other. An edge is created for each
< domain, IP > tuple in the dataset. The bipartite graph is
dubbed domain resolution graph.
Intuitively, web-hosting services, cloud providers and con-
tent delivery network (CDN) may host many unrelated do-
mains under one or several IP addresses. For example, two
domains hosted by the same IP in Aamzon Web Service
(AWS) (or CloudFlare, Akamai) could belong to different
owners. One domain being malicious does not imply that
the other one is likely to be malicious. An efficient heuristic
approach to fix this problem is to exclude the ”popular” IPs,
which host more than t domains in a certain period, from
the domain resolved data [29]. Figure 3 shows the degree
distribution of IPs in the original domain resolution graphs
of the two dataset (week-1 and week-2). The x − axis is
the accumulation of the numbers of IPs sorted based on their
degrees, while the y − axis axis shows the corresponding
degrees. For example, the point (300, 1500) in Figure 3 means
that there are 300 IPs each hosts 1500 domains. The IP degree
distribution shows us that a small group of IPs host most of the
domains. Empirically, we set t to be 1500, where only 292 and
190 IPs respectively are excluded from the domain resolution
graphs of the two datasets. It is a negligible percentage (0.05%
and 0.09% respectively) of the total IPs in the original datasets.
Another important property of our datasets is the number
and size of connected components in the domain resolution
graph. The size of connected components in the domain
resolution graphs has a significant effect on the malicious score
computation time, especially for message passing approaches,
such as BP algorithm. Figure 4 provides the distribution of
the number of nodes (domains and IPs) of the top connected
components in the domain resolution graphs of the two
datasets. It roughly follows a power law distribution based
on the logarithmic scale. An efficient heuristic to reduce the
computation time of both domain graph generation as well as
inference algorithm execution is to operate on each connected
component separately instead of the whole graph.
Ground Truth Collection. Our malicious ground truth
is collected through McAfee SiteAdvisor [5]. It labels each
domain into one of the four categories: safe, caution, warning
and unknown. The label “safe” indicates that a domain is
benign, whereas “caution” is used to show that a domain
may bring a minor risk. The label “unknown” means that
SiteAdvisor does not have sufficient information to categorize
a domain. Finally, the label “warning” indicates that a domain
has a major risk of being malicious. In our experiments, we use
“warning” domains as our malicious ground truth. For benign
ground truth, we follow previous research in this area [37],
[29], and use Alexa top 1 million domains [13], in addition to
the “safe” domains from SiteAdvisor.
Empirical Evaluaton. We conduct experiments to study the
impact of different types of associations on domain coverage
and detection accuracy. We use the association defined in [29]
as a baseline. Table II lists the sizes of the domain graphs
generated from our two types of associations, as well as the
baseline graph for the two active DNS datasets (week-1 and
week-2). The table clearly shows that both of our proposed
associations significantly expand the domain coverage. For
example, G-New is almost 10 times the size of G-Baseline
in the active DNS data of the week of Feb. 4-10, 2017. This
is mainly because the associations defined in [29] are overly
restrictive. Specifically, associations are established only be-
tween domains that frequently change hosting environments
among different ASs. Domains that do not change hosting
IPs and those that change hosting IPs within the same AS
are not considered. For example, in week-1 (Table II), more
than 82% of the domains that share IPs satisfy only the
dedicated association rule, and hence are completely ignored
in G-Baseline. The table also shows that our second type of
associations provides even larger domain coverage compared
to the first type. For example, G-Relaxed is about 2.7 times the
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Fig. 2: An example domain-IP graph and its corresponding domain graphs
size of G-New in week-1. This is due to the relaxed association
rule which generates a super-set of the associations generated
by the corresponding dedicated association rule. Specifically,
two domains that resolve to different dedicated IPs in the same
/24-subnet are associated in G-Relaxed but are not associated
in G-New.
TABLE II: Sizes of Domain Graphs
Dataset
# of Domains in domain graph
G-Baseline G-New G-Relaxed
week-1 (Feb. 4-10, 2017) 3,980 39,604 106,222
week-2 (Feb. 20-26, 2017) 2,449 18,779 43,661
We conduct extensive set of experiments to infer malicious
domains by applying the path-based algorithm over the three
domain graphs (G-Baseline, G-New, and G-Relaxed). We
implemented the path-based inference algorithm with Apache
Giraph, running on a cluster with 2 nodes (each with 48 2.7-
GHz cores and 256 GB aggregated memory).
When computing true positive rate (TPR) and false positive
rate (FPR), we use ten-fold cross validation. We randomly
divide the malicious ground truth into ten folds and perform
10 round executions of the inference algorithm. In each round,
we pickup one different fold as training set and the remaining
nine folds as test set. We repeat the ten-fold testing for 5 times
using different random divisions of the malicious ground truth
each time, which gives a total of 50 execution rounds of the
inference algorithm. For each round, we compute the TPR and
the FPR for various threshold values (malicioust). For each
malicioust value, the TPR is computed as the percentage
of malicious domains in the malicious test set with scores
above malicioust. The FPR is computed as the percentage
of domains in the benign ground truth with scores above
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malicioust. malicioust is varied between 0 and 1 with 0.01
steps. We finally report TPR and FPR for each malicioust
threshold value as the average over the values in the fifty
rounds.
Figure 5 shows the ROC curves of the true positive rate
and the false positive rate on the three domain graphs for
two different weeks. The figure clearly shows that our first
type of associations results in better detection accuracy than
the baseline. For example, with the same 99% true positive
rate, G-New has a 0.63% false positive rate compared to
the 1.33% false positive rate in G-Baseline for the week
of Feb. 4-10, 2017. Therefore, our first type of associations
not only significantly expands domain coverage, but also
proves to be stronger and more meaningful as evidenced
by the improvement in detection accuracy. The degradation
in detection accuracy in G-Baseline is mainly due to the
noise introduced by the public hosting environments. In public
hosting environments, domains from unrelated owners would
be hosted at the same pool of IPs. Combining this with the fact
that some public hosting environments span more than one AS
(e.g., both AS16509 and AS14618 belong to Amazon), would
result in wrong associations. That is, two unrelated domains
may still be associated even if they only use services from a
single provider, which degrades the quality of the associations,
and consequently affects the detection accuracy.
Figure 5 also shows that, even though our second type of
associations has the largest domain coverage (Table II), the
detection accuracy on G-Relaxed is much worse. For example,
to achieve a reasonable true positive rate of 93.16%, the
false positive rate soars to 2.36% in the active DNS data
of the week of Feb. 4-10, 2017. This can be attributed to
the relaxed association rule that obviously generates weak
or irrelevant associations. Therefore, not all associations that
expand domain coverage lead to acceptable detection accuracy.
This clearly highlights the intricate challenge in designing
appropriate associations that can achieve the delicate balance
of increasing domain coverage while improving, or at least not
considerably degrading, detection accuracy.
Before we conclude this section, we would like to provide
our rationale behind using /24-subnet for the construction of
domain graphs. We in fact experimented with different subnet
sizes from 18 to 26 to study the effect on the expansion of the
domain graph and the accuracy of malicious domain detection.
As can be seen from Figure 6, the domain coverage increases
with increasing size of subnets. This is expected as with larger
subnets, our association rules are able to find more domains
that can be associated with one another. However, not all such
associations are strong enough to accurately detect malicious
domains. As shown in Figure 7, we get the best accuracy,
i.e., the least false positive rate, when the subnet size is 24.
Figure 7 shows the false positive rate for path-based and BP
algorithms on G − New domain graph. One possible reason
for this behavior, as mentioned earlier, is that when subnet
sizes are large, it may represent IPs from multiple unrelated
ASs and when subnet sizes are small, IPs for the same AS may
get split into different subnets resulting in weaker or incorrect
associations.
V. DETECTION ACCURACY AND SCALABILITY TRADEOFF
The path-based inference algorithm has a complexity of
O(s|V |2), where s is the size of the malicious seed and V is
the set of vertexes in G-New. Even with the help of distributed
computing platforms, it could still be quite expensive to handle
large-scale DNS data. In this section, we investigate techniques
to strike a good balance between detection accuracy and
efficiency.
One natural alternative is BP. We implemented the BP
algorithm in C program and ran it in a single multi-core server
with 48 2.7-GHz cores and 256 GB memory. Our experiments
follow the convergence rules of BP that are mentioned earlier
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Fig. 5: Path-based algorithm over three domain graphs
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in Section II with the convergence threshold and the maximum
number of iterations are empirically selected as 1×10−10 and
15, respectively.
As shown in Figure 8, our experiments confirm what has
been shown before [29] that applying BP directly on the
bipartite graph corresponding to the whole DNS data yields
very poor detection accuracy. For example, applying BP on
week-1 results in 49% false positive rate for a true positive
rate of 99%. The reason is that we cannot conclude the
maliciousness of an IP simply because a malicious domain
is resolved to it. In other words, hosting relationships alone
are not strong enough to reliably reason the maliciousness of
unknown domains and IPs. As shown in Section III-B, the
enhanced domain graph captures much stronger relationships
between domains. It would be compelling to investigate how
BP on domain graphs could assist in producing results with
acceptable accuracy with much less computational cost.
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As in each round of BP a single message is passed along
each edge, the complexity of one-round BP is simply O(|E|),
where E is the set of edges. In a sparse graph, |E| is multi-
magnitude smaller than |V |2. Though in the worst case, many
rounds of propagation has to be performed until convergence1,
in practice it is often sufficient to stop after a pre-determined
constant number of rounds (e.g., 15 or 20). Thus, BP over the
domain graph could be much more efficient than using the
path-based algorithm.
Note that the path-based algorithm is specifically designed
for malicious domain detection over domain graphs (e.g., the
explicit decay mechanism and the particular way of combining
inferences from multiple malicious seeds). BP on the other
hand is a generic inference algorithm that could only implicitly
reflect some of the intuitions behind the path-based approach
1In fact for some special graphs, BP may never converge
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(e.g., the influence of a node is diminishing when a message is
passed along a long path), which may lead to lower detection
accuracy.
We also explore another possible way to apply BP over G-
New, based on the following observation. Suppose that an en-
tity hosts n domains on its server with a dedicated IP. Reflected
in G-New, we will have a clique among these n domains, with
n(n−1)/2 edges. Meanwhile, in the original bipartite domain
resolution graph, there will be only n edges between these
domains and the dedicated IP. In general, G-New would be
much denser than the bipartite domain resolution graph. Since
the complexity of BP is proportional to the number of edges,
to further improve efficiency, another alternative is to run BP
on the bipartite graph reduced by the domains in G-New. In
detail, given the original domain resolution graph, we keep an
edge between a domain d and an IP only if d is in G-New.
The resulting bipartite graph has the same set of domains as
G-New, but would be much sparser. Therefore, running BP
over this reduced bipartite graph would also be more efficient
than over G-New.
This approach, however, could cause further deterioration
of detection accuracy, due to several reasons. First, inferences
become less direct. An edge in G-New is now corresponding
to multiple indirect paths due to intermediate IP nodes in
the bipartite graph. The longer the paths, the weaker the
inference. Second, probably more importantly, the induced
bipartite graph could introduce unreliable associations. For
instance, consider two domains d1 and d2 who only share a
single public IP i, though they may share dedicated IPs or IPs
from different ASs with other domains, and thus appear in G-
New. In G-New there would be no direct edge between them.
However, in the induced graph, we will have edges (d1, i) and
(d2, i), which could cause unwanted inference when applying
BP.
Figure 9 shows ROC curves of the three approaches: the
path-based approach and BP over G-New, and BP over the
induced bipartite graph. Our first observation is that all three
approaches achieve high detection accuracy. For both datasets,
they achieve more than 99% true positive rates with less than
1% false positive rates. This demonstrates the effectiveness of
our proposed association scheme. Since it captures accurately
the connection between domains, even with generic inference
techniques, malicious domains could still be identified accu-
rately. Second, the path-based approach indeed offers supe-
rior detection accuracy in both datasets, which is consistent
with our intuition. Depending on the datasets, with the same
high true positive rate (over 99%), the path-based inference
algorithm’s false positive rates are one-third or half of that of
the approaches using BP. For the two approaches using BP,
in general, the one running over G-New offers a little better
accuracy, though it could be insignificant, depending on the
datasets.
Given the seemingly rather small advantage of the path-
based approach in terms of false positive rates, one may
wonder whether it matters in practice. We note that, due to
base-rate fallacy [19], it could indeed have a significant impact.
For example, suppose 98% of all checked domains are benign
(the base rate), with the same high true positive rate (99%), a
0.2% false positive rate would result in 90% precision (i.e., the
percentage of the detected domains that are indeed malicious).
A seemingly slight increase of the false positive rate to 0.6%
would reduce the precision to 70%.
Next, we compare their efficiency and scalability when
handling large-scale DNS data. For this purpose, we generate
synthetic domain resolution graphs with different scales (5×,
10×, 20× and 40× respectively) based on a real domain
resolution graph (Feb. 20-26, 2017). The graph generation
algorithm ensures that the synthetic graphs have the same
degree distribution as the real one.
Figure 10 shows the running time (in log scale) of the
three approaches when we scale up the DNS dataset. Note
that the running time reported here excludes the time of
other overheads (e.g., loading graphs to the distributed file
system in Giraph) to clearly illustrate the difference of their
computational costs. We see that though all three algorithms
can handle the small graph (Graph 1×) efficiently, the running
time of the path-based algorithm increases rapidly when we
scale up the graph. For example, when handling the domain
graph (with 751,160 nodes and 4,129,156 edges) derived
from Graph 40×, it takes the path-based approach more than
2000 seconds to finish, while the running times of the two
BP approaches are below 20 seconds. BP over the induced
bipartite graph (BG-New) clearly offers the best performance
due to the reduced number of edges.
Figures 9 and 10 suggest a clear tradeoff between the three
approaches: with sufficient computational resources and when
handling moderate scale data, the path-based approach would
yield the best detection accuracy. When handling large-scale
data, applying BP over G-New or the induced bipartite graphs
would offer practical scalable solutions with good detection
accuracy.
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Fig. 9: Detection accuracy of Path-based algorithm and BP algorithm
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VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we compare and contrast our work with the
previous research in the same area.
IP Address Classification: Historically, IP address classi-
fication is motivated by the need to efficiently allocate IPs
to different organizations as well as to improve the efficiency
of routing IP packets from one router to another [44]. Xie
et al. [56] propose a technique to automatically classify IP
addresses as dynamic, that is, DHCP allocated IPs, and static
using Hotmail server logs in order to identify spams. Their
observation is that most of the spam email servers are hosted
at dynamic IP addresses. However, this observation is not
reflected on the malicious domains we identified and, thus,
such an IP classification does not assist us in constructing
domain graphs with strong associations. Recently, Scott et
al. [45] propose to capture the IP footprint of CDN (content
delivery network) deployments. While this work identifies IPs
of shared infrastructures, these IPs may not necessarily be
public IPs as we classify in our work in order to detect
malicious domains. IP ranges of Cloud computing platforms,
such as Amazon AWS [8], Microsoft Azure [6] and Google
Cloud [10], are usually available for everyone. However, not
all these IPs are public as we define in this study. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to accurately classify IPs
in the wild as public and dedicated.
Malicious Domain Detection: There is a vast body of re-
search devoted to detecting malicious domains via static anal-
ysis. Such research work can be classified into two techniques,
host-based and network-based. Briefly, host-based approaches
rely on detecting malware signatures in programs running on
end hosts [30], [41], whereas network-based approaches rely
on detecting specific patterns and fingerprints by monitoring
the network traffic [17], [29]. Since our approach is network-
based, we compare and contrast the most relevant network-
based proposals which rely on DNS data for malicious domain
detection. Network-based approaches can further be divided
into classification based (e.g., [25], [40], [15], [52], [16], [20])
and inference based approaches (e.g., [29], [60], [37], [49]).
While the classification based approaches primarily rely on lo-
cal network and host information, inference based approaches
exploit the global relationships among domains along with
local information in order to better detect malicious domains.
Our work falls in the latter category. Now we compare and
contrast our work with respect to these two categories below.
Classification based approaches. Many approaches [25],
[40], [15], [52], including Notos [16] and EXPOSURE [20],
identify malicious domains by building a classifier using the
local features extracted from passive DNS data along with
other network information such as WHOIS records [36]. Such
approaches are effective as long as the local features used
in the classification are not manipulated. However, it has
been shown [47] that many local features such as TTL based
features and patterns in domain names, are easy to manipu-
late and thus rendering such techniques less effective. These
approaches perform best when one has access to sensitive
individual DNS queries which are difficult to gain access
to. On the other hand, inference based approaches like ours
can detect malicious domains with high accuracy using only
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aggregate DNS data which is relatively easier to gain access
to.
Inference based approaches. Inference based approaches
have been proposed to complement classification based ap-
proaches by considering not only local network features but
also the associations among domains. We already discussed the
related work by Manadhata et al. [37] and Khalil et al. [29]
in Section I and Section II.
Zou et al. [61] proposed a similar approach based on BP
but they utilized domain-IP associations in addition to domain-
host associations in order to build the graph. Active DNS data
used in our study can also be modeled as a bipartite graph
and then BP can be applied the bipartite graph. However, we
observe that the accuracy of the inference is unacceptably low
as the associations in the Active DNS data are much more
weaker than those in DNS query logs.
SMASH [60] is an unsupervised approach to infer groups
of related servers involved in malware campaigns. It focuses
on server side communication patterns extracted from HTTP
traffic to systematically mine relations among servers from
multiple dimensions. SMASH is novel in proposing a mecha-
nism that utilizes connections among malicious severs to detect
malware campaigns in contrast to classification schemes that
solely use individual server features. Our approach is similar
to SMASH in establishing server associations as bases for
identifying new malicious servers, but complements SMASH
by utilizing active DNS data, in contrast to HTTP traffic,
which offers privacy benefits as active DNS data is publicly
available database and has no privacy or security liability
associated with it. Additionally, instead of using second-level
domain names, our approach establishes associations among
fully qualified domain names. This relaxes the assumption
in SMASH that servers with the same second-level domain
belong to the same organization and hence, our approach
detects malicious dynamic DNS servers.
Additionally, Gao et al. [26] propose an approach to detect
malicious domains exploiting temporal correlations in DNS
queries. Rahbarinia et al. [40] constructs a host-to-domain
bipartite graph to efficiently detect new malicious domains
by tracking the DNS query behavior using DNS data col-
lected from within large scale ISP networks. Stevanovic et
al. [46] identify compromised hosts by analyzing DNS traffic
traces from different operational ISP networks. All of these
approaches rely on individual DNS queries made by users
which are not readily available with aggregate data sources
such as Active DNS datasets we use in this study.
Very recently, Alrwais et al. [14] analyze and detect bullet-
proof hosting (BPH) services, which provide Internet miscre-
ants with infrastructure that is resilient to complaints of illicit
activities, on legitimate hosting providers. They shed lights on
how BPH services have moved from self-managed monolithic
infrastructure to the sub-allocations within third-party hosting
services in order to evade reputation based detection such as
BGP ranking and ASwatch [31]. They detect malicious sub-
allocations within ASs as opposed to malicious ASs [22], [48].
They rely on two key datasets: Whois dataset that is used to
spot sub-allocations, and Passive DNS dataset, that is used
to extract signals indicating malicious behavior. While their
approach detects a very specific subset of malicious IPs, our
approach is designed to detect any malicious domains in the
wild that behave similar to known malicious domains. We
believe that their detection accuracy could be improved by
adopting our techniques of detecting malicious domains.
Dynamic Malware Analysis: Unlike the static malware
analysis discussed above, dynamic malware analysis usually
consists of executing sample malware artifacts in a secure,
controlled and isolated environment. Such executions provide
a complementary means of studying the behavior of malware
and how it interact with the system including the network and
file system. A number of studies [42], [54], [38] have analyzed
rouge infrastructure used to distribute malware in order to
detect malicious systems including command and control
servers and malware distribution servers. More recently, Lever
et al. [35] analyze using several large malware and network
datasets that span across 5 years. They show that Internet
miscreants are increasingly using potentially unwanted pro-
grams (PUPs) [32], [51] to launch attacks and build classifiers
to differentiate between PUPs from malware domains. As
previous research has confirmed, they show at a large scale
that, for the majority of malware samples they studied, network
traffic provides the earliest indicator of infection which is in
fact several weeks and even often months before the malware
sample is discovered. This shows that frequent execution of
reputation based approaches using DNS data like ours could
identify and build up-to-date blacklists helping in the cause of
blocking and mitigating malware.
VII. CONCLUSION
Active DNS data is an important and easily accessible
information source for malicious domain detection. However,
compared to other types of DNS data, active DNS data
offer limited information. Overcoming the inherent limita-
tions, we design a novel domain association scheme based
on active DNS data to facilitate inference-based malicious
domain detection. Our scheme relies on a deep analysis of
dedicated and public IPs, which significantly improves over
existing domain association schemes in terms of not only
domain coverage but also detection accuracy. We show that
our scheme could be integrated with both specific path-based
inference algorithms and generic inference algorithms such as
BP. We further explore ways to improve the efficiency and
scalability of malicious domain detection, and carefully study
the tradeoff with detection accuracy. For future work, it would
be interesting to investigate means to integrate active DNS data
with other pubic data sources (e.g, domain authoritative servers
and WHOIS records) and further strengthen the quality of
domain associations. Another possible avenue is to empirically
evaluate the effectiveness of our association scheme with other
types of DNS data.
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